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Abstract Cooperativebehavioramonga groupofagents is studied assumingadaptiveinteractions.
Each agent plays a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff
andimitates thestrategyofits best neighbor.Agentsmaypunishor rewardtheirneighborsbyremov-
ing or sustaining the interactions, accordingto their satisfaction level and strategy played. Whenever
an agent prefers to dismiss an interaction, the corresponding neighbor is replaced by another ran-
domly chosen agent, introducing diversity and evolution to the agents neighborhoods. Numerical
and analytical study shows the existence of a full-defective state coexisting with a highly coopera-
tive steady state. The latter equilibrium solution is composed mostly by cooperative agents, with a
minor population of defectors that exploit the cooperators. It is shown how the network adaptation
dynamics favors the emergence of cooperators with highest payoff. These “leaders” are shown to
sustain the global cooperative steady state. Also we ﬁnd the surprising result that on average, the
average payoff of defectors is larger than the average payoff of cooperators, recovering the dilemma
at a macro scale. Whenever “leaders” are perturbed (e.g. by addition of noise), an unstable situation
arises and global cascades with oscillations between the nearly full defection network and the fully
cooperative outcome are observed.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of collaboration in a group of agents has been traditionally discussed in the past us-
ing the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Weibull 1996). Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) showed how
cooperation may be sustained by reciprocity in a population of agents meeting repeatedly with a
certain degree of rationality. In evolutionary game theory, one general assumption is that players do
not have any preferencewith whom to play, thus they are randomlyselected and matched. However,
in many social and economic environments this assumption does not hold and agents in fact display
repeated encounters with only a subset of a large population (Kirman 1999). This speciﬁc feature is
naturally modeled with the aid of a network, where economic agents sit and interact only with their
neighbors. This work will focus on the dynamics of the PD played on a network, with the attractive
feature that the network itself is allowed to adapt according to the strategy and satisfaction level of
the individual agents. Examples of other work using a network of interaction as a fundamental con-
stituent range from herd behavior and information dispersal in ﬁnancial markets1, market-structure
modeling (Kirman 1993), and ﬁrm competition in an oligopoly (Ferrer, Ania, and Vega-Redondo
1999, Goyal and Joshi 1999).
Studies using PD games with ﬁxed local interactions have shown that cooperation could be es-
tablished for a range of parameters, before defection invades the whole population(Nowak and May
1992, Nowak and May 1993, Lindgren and Nordahl 1994, Lindgren 1997, Huberman and Glance
1993, Kirchkamp 1995, Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod 1999). However it is well known that in many
social systems individuals are continuously creating or suppressing interactions according to the
beneﬁts of the relationship. One example occurs in scientiﬁc collaboration networks, where scien-
tists usually work in small groups of collaborations, and the relationships evolve under performance
and self-interest of the individual members.
This paper address the problem of how cooperation may be sustained when local interactions
evolve. Our results indicate that cooperation may be sustained as a result of heterogenous neighbor-
hoods which arise in the dynamical evolution. In particular, a PD game on an adaptive network is
studied, where cooperationcan be promotedand sustained by local interactions and a network adap-
tation process. Our contribution follows the bounded rationality paradigm. This includes a limited
capacityto anticipatefutureopponentsstrategies, and in particularthe networkadaptationdeals with
the followingassumptions: (i) dependingon the strategy played and a satisfaction criteria, every link
is evaluated for continuing or suppressing the interaction, (ii) individuals are not capable of com-
puting a priori the best response as to whom connect, and they instead rely on a random selection
of new partners, (iii) in the expectation of obtaining a beneﬁt, individuals a priori always accept
the proposed new interactions with new neighbors, (iv) the total number of links in the network is
conserved. The latter point assumes a constrained resource environment,and introduces a limitation
into the possible network conﬁgurations.
The proposed game considers that each agent either plays cooperation (C) or defection (D) with
all its local neighbors, as prescribed by the interaction network. In other words, we do not take into
account memory and we label each agent as either a C- or D-agent. The strategy is revisited each
time step by imitating the neighbor’s strategy with highest aggregate payoff. This very simple strat-
egy update algorithm, already showed to promote cooperation in some region of the PD parameter
space2. The network dynamics considered affects only links between D-agents. We argue that these
links are ’disliked’ by both agents, so given a certain probability, one of the agents may exchange
the neighbor with a randomly chosen agent from the whole network. In other words, the network
adaptation drives unsatisﬁed D-agents to ‘search’ for other C-agents to exploit.
1 See for example Bannerjee (1992), Cont and Bouchaud (2000) or Eguiluz and Zimmermann (2000).
2 See Nowak and May (1992), Nowak and May (1993), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Lindgren (1997) and
Huberman and Glance (1993). Kirchkamp (1995) studies also a cellular automata representation and several
learning rules, and compares results from Nowak and May (1992) and Huberman and Glance (1993).Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 3
We have established results on the existence and stability of steady states. By steady state we
refer to a state of the system where the network and strategies remain stationary. These states are
composed of chains of cooperators, with defectors only exploiting C-agents. In order to understand
the robustness of steady states, and the evolution of the network, we have also studied how the
perturbations affect these equilibria. We show how perturbations may actually grow, maintain or
destroy the chains of cooperators. These perturbations can lead to global oscillations between states
with a large fraction of cooperators and another state with a large fraction of defectors, or even a
complete all-defector state.
The emergenceof global cooperativesteady states is foundto dependexclusively on the survival
of certain C-agents with maximum payoff in the network, which from now on we label C-leaders.
We establish conditions for the evolution of the payoff of C-leaders and wealthy C-agents which
is directly connected to the same network adaptation performed by D-agents. Interesting dynamics
arise in a certain region of parameters, where a competition between C- and D-leaders is observed.
A close study of this competition shows that there are certain perturbations which induce global
cascades in the system, where C-leaders may be destroyed. The asymptotic outcome of whole pop-
ulation depends crucially on the survival of C-leaders, and a full defective network is reached when
all C-leaders disappear.
With the aid of extensive numerical simulations we study for a wide range of networks and
PD parameters how cooperation performs. Previous results with ﬁxed networks
￿
, cooperation was
shown to dominate up to a critical value of the PD parameters, where defection invaded the whole
system. In our case, depending on the initial conditions, either the cooperative steady state or the
all-D network is always reached. One of the surprising result we ﬁnd is that in general the average
payoff of D-agents is larger than that of C-agents, which also points in the direction that cooperation
is sustained mainly due to the C-leaders. Finally, we study the robustness of steady states by intro-
ducing exogenous perturbations, such as errors in the imitation of a neighbors strategy. We ﬁnd that
these exogenous perturbations affect the survival probability of C-leaders. The network is robust up
to a certain noise threshold, after which a full defective outcome is reached.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne the evolutionary network model. Sec-
tion 3 describes the formal analysis, including steady state solutions and stability, as well as a result
on the payoff evolution of C-leaders. In Section 4 we show numerical experiments describing how
a highly cooperative state is reached, topological properties of the asymptotic networks, a detailed
explanation for the large cascades observed for certain parameters and a robustness study when
exogenousperturbationsare allowed. Finally in Section 5 we discuss our results and open problems.
2 The model
We consider a game where
￿ agents play the Prisoner Dilemma on a network
￿ . Each agent
￿
plays with a subset known as the neighbors, which will be allowed to evolve as speciﬁed below.
Each interaction among two agents is represented in
￿ by an undirected link, and the neighbors of
agent











￿ . We will consider random networks as a good representationof
social networks, where each agent has a different local environment of interaction (Amaral, Scala,
Barthelemy, and Stanley 2000). An important parameter of the network is the average connectiv-
ity
￿ , which corresponds to the average number of links each agent has. We consider in general
networks where the total number of agents
￿ is much larger than the typical connectivity




























































































As discussed in the Introduction, we follow the bounded rationality paradigm. Agents are as-
sumed not to have the computational power to anticipate strategic moves of opponents (agents have
no memory), nor compute a priori the best agent to whom connect. Their rationality only allows
them to play the same strategy with all its neighbors, observe the aggregate payoff of its neighbors
and its strategy (from the payoff obtained), and whenever the agents changes opponents they rely on








￿ by a very simple prescription.The game occurs in discrete time
# and
each step is divided into three stages: (S i) every agent plays the PD game with its neighbors, (S ii)
every agent imitates the strategy of the best neighbor,(S iii) every agent applies a network dynamics
which adapts its local neighborhood.
We use asynchronousupdate,whereall theagentsdecideat thesame timetheir strategyandtheir
respective new neighborhood for the next time step. An alternative speciﬁcation would correspond
to select each time step a single random agent, an perform the above steps with data corresponding
at that time of update. This is known as asynchronous update and is not explored in this work.
The ﬁrst two stages are straightforward and follows (Nowak and May 1992),
(S i) each agent
￿ plays a PD game with each neighbor using the same strategy
￿



















































￿ is the local connectivity of agent





























(S ii) each agent
￿ revisits its current strategy by simply imitating neighbor’s strategy with highest





































































which points to the agent’s
￿ neighbor with highest payoff3. In the remaining of the paper we
will say that agent











￿ . The discrete time


































￿ ; otherwise it will be unsatisﬁed and a neighbors
strategy will be imitated. Notice that this allows for agents to be conformists, which would cor-
respond to unsatisﬁed agents which imitate the same strategy they already have.
3 If there is more than one neighbors with the same maximum payoff other than agent
U itself, then one is
picked randomly. If agent
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A very simple strategy update was chosen in order to compare with previous results obtained
by several authors on non-adaptive networks
￿
. In the literature other learning rules were explored.
Young (1999) studies a coordinationgame with local interactions, where a majority local rule seems
better motivated (a sort of local best reply model, Blume (1993)), in order to study the selection
of an equilibrium. Also Kirchkamp and Schlag (1995) discussed an evolutionary process where the
learningrule itself reproducesand mutates, in order to ﬁnd the best learning rule for local interacting
agents.
The speciﬁcation of how each agent adapts its neighbors is based on a discussion in Kirman
(1999). The ﬁrst step in the evalution procedure takes into account a local satisfaction measure.










￿ ) agents to review their neighborhoods. The second
step involves a classiﬁcation of neighbors depending on the expected payoff. An agent will have
an incentive to maintain an interaction with a neighbor if the payoff received matches the possible
maximum (given the strategy played); otherwise the agent will consider to dismiss the interaction.
An application of this argument to the three possible pairwise interactions is straightforward. Two
C-agents connected by a link will on each side try to maintain the interaction, because the payoff
obtained is the highest allowed by its strategy. On the contrary, two D-agents connected by a link,
receivestheminimumpayoffallowedbyits strategy,soeachagentwilltrytodismiss thisinteraction.
A C-agentand a D-agent connectedby a link, will haveoppositereactions.On onehand,the C-agent
will try to dismiss the interaction, while on the other the D-agent will try to maintain it. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that this opposite reaction balances. Thus the dissatisfaction experienced
by a C-agent of being exploited by a defector, offsets the satisfaction of a D-agent for exploiting a
C-neighbor. In conclusion, given this assumption only unsatisﬁed D-agents reviews its interactions
with D-neighbors.
To complete the networkadaptation,we assume that wheneveran unsatisﬁed D-agents dismisses
a D-neighbor, it randomly selects a new agent from the whole network
￿ and engages in a new
interaction. The selected agent always accepts the new neighbor, because a priori the unknown new
neighborcanimproveits aggregateutility.Notice thatD-neighborsdonotcontributeto theaggregate
payoff of C-agents. Therefore cooperators are insensitive to the number of D-agents they have or






throughoutthe whole dynamicalevolution.The networkadaptationis deﬁned as a stochastic process










which corresponds to the probability for an unsatisﬁed
D-agent to dismiss and ﬁnd a new neighbor and introduces a time scale for the network evolution.
In summary, the network adaptation stage considered in this paper is:
(S iii) each agent











￿ ), by the following
Network Dynamics (ND): if












￿ , and replace it by randomlychoosingagent
￿
￿ uniformly from the network
￿ .




















































































￿ . It is clear that this rule conserves the total
number of links, and thus the average connectivity
￿ .




￿ ) as long as they have D-neighbors. This adaptation corresponds to a form of
“searching” of other C-agents from whom to exploit a better payoff. If succeeded, this will increase
the aggregate payoff in the next time step, and below we discuss in detail the different scenarios
which may occur in subsequent time steps. On the other hand, C-agents are conservative in nature,
and as discussed above,they do not have an incentivea priorito endogenouslyadapt their neighbors:6 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz
they may onlyaccept new neighbors.Thus the networkupdateconsideredestablishes an asymmetric






We will restrict the use of “conformist” to unsatisﬁed C-agents imitating other C-agents. D-




￿ ). Finally, we remark that unlike other studies in adaptive networks, we do not allow an indirect
payoff due to the neighbors’ neighbors, as for example in (Watts 1999, Goyal and Joshi 1999).
Therefore we analyze the evolution based on strict ﬁrst neighbors interactions.
3 Analysis
In this section we provide results on the organizationand stability of the network, by having a close





￿ , and corresponds to network conﬁgurations and individual strategies which remain stationary
in time. The multiplicity of these solutions is huge, for a fair number of agents. However they have
certaincommonfeaturesthatwe nowreveal.Also, andveryinteresting,perturbationsactingonthem
may produce signiﬁcant changes to the whole network. The more complicated dynamical aspects of
evolutionwill be dealtin Section4, wherenumericalsimulationswill behelpful.Also in this section,
we introduce the notion of leaders, which is important in order to understand how the asymptotic
steady state may be reached: either a nearly full cooperative state, or a full defective one. These
results will be exempliﬁed in Section 4.
3.1 Existence of steady states
As deﬁned above,steady states will refer to equilibriumstates where the network conﬁgurationsand
individualstrategies remain stationary in time. For the sake of clarity, lets ﬁrst consider some simple










￿ ) network composed









￿ , or otherwise conformists (if they are unsatisﬁed) because they imitate
their same strategy from a better agent. In both cases, they will not change their individual payoff,
nor their local neighborhoods, for there are no D-agents in network
￿ . In the other extreme, for a
network composed of only D-agent’s, the average payoff remains stationary in time, but the network
conﬁguration and the individual payoff will be perpetually evolving4. From the above deﬁnition, we
will not consider the latter example a steady state, and we refer to this state as all-D network5. This
state is of interest for it is one of the possible asymptotic states the dynamics of the system may
reach.
Lets introducethenotionofchainof agents.Dueto the strategyupdatewe implemented,forward






￿ starting from any agent
￿ , traces a connected component in the
network conﬁguration with non-decreasing payoff. Thus a chain of agents starting at agent
￿ and
length
















































































￿ ). In particular
we will discuss the behavior of chains of cooperators and defectors.
The above deﬁnition in terms of payoff suggests the introduction of other helpful notions. Lets
deﬁne a local maximum in payoff as the agent














with at least a neighbor







￿ . However, we distinguish as
a passive local maximum the extreme situation where none of the neighbors


































2 . Finally a local minimum in payoff corresponds
4 Unless they all have the same number of neighbors so that everyone is satisﬁed, and ND does not apply; a
very unlikely situation we do not consider.
5 Notice this state is absorbing for once the system reaches this state, the dynamics itself cannot remove it.Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 7
to an agent











7 . Figure 1 illustrates several chains of































D has attached also two passive local maxima (agent
N and
￿ ). Also the


































Y is a local maximum, D-agents
￿
and







Y is a branching point,
where two chains meet.




￿ , non-trivial steady states may arise. Chains
of cooperators are a possible stable situation, for ND does not apply. On the other hand, a chain of
defectors is unstable, for ND applies on all its members except the local maxima. Thus in steady
states conﬁgurations defectors cannot form chains, and may only have C-neighbors. More speciﬁ-
cally D-agents must be passive local maxima in order for their strategy not to be replicated by its
neighbor chains of cooperators, i.e. no agent imitates D-agents. In conclusion, the only stationary
situation in terms of strategy and network conﬁgurations leading to steady states involves C-agents
forming chains, where replication of C-strategy takes place, while D-neighbors do not form chains
and are passive local maxima. In particular D-agents may become solitary or ostracized6 (without
links).
As one can imagine,in generalthe multiplicity of chains is huge when the total numberof agents













2 the number of C-
neighbors D-agent













































































































in order to be a stationary conﬁguration.
In conclusion we have,
Proposition 1 A steady state exists only when D-agents are either passive local maxima which in-
teract exclusively to C-agents in a chain (satisfying Eq. (7)), or are ostracized (have no links).
In otherwords, a steady state is composedexclusivelyof a network of cooperators,and defectors









imitation dynamics is much faster than the network evolution, and strategies equilibrate faster than
the neighborhoods.Therefore a useful indicator to control whether the system reached a steady state
for the numeric simulations in Section 4 is to monitor when the number of links between D-agents
vanishes.
6 See ?) for PD game with the possibility of ostracism.8 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz
3.2 Stability of steady states
Once established the properties of the steady states, we investigate their stability. We will show that
particular perturbations will grow cooperative networks, while some other may trigger large scale











































Fig. 2 Schematic diagram showing different types of perturbations to a chain of cooperators
￿ . By the ND, D-
agent
￿
chooses as new neighbor agent
U establishing a new link (dashed line) at time
￿ . The diagram illustrates





























































































































D . Stability can
now be studied on each component
￿
2 . For this, lets assume the network is “close” to a steady




their D-neighbors repeatedly “searching” for C-neighbors. These perturbations will affect not only
the defectors own payoff, but may produce changes in the local neighborhood of the new chosen
agent. Different situations may arise depending on the actual payoff of the perturbing D-agent, and
in which C-agent the perturbation falls.
In Fig. 2 we show a schematic diagram showing 3 different cases which may arise. Consider a
chain of cooperators
￿ receives the new D-neighbor
N at time step



















7 are again computed at stage (S i) and their relative
value may fall in any of the possibilities shown in Fig. 27:














￿ , then at





￿ pointsto anotherD-agent,then we mayguaranteeonlythat thereis a ﬁnite probabilitythat
the D-perturbation becomes a C-agent. This occurs when in a number of time steps (depending
on














￿ in the next time step), or the new neighbor is a cooperator with
a larger payoff than
N . In both cases, agent
N imitates C-strategy in the following time step. Of
course, during these intermediate time steps the network also evolves, and again we can only
concludea ﬁnite probabilityfor the switch of strategy. In conclusion dependingon the neighbor-
hood structure of the D-perturbation
N , there is a ﬁnite probability that
N becomes a cooperator.
We will refer to this type of perturbationsas constructive, and is a primarymechanism to enlarge
the cooperator’s population.





Y do not have any other direct link to the chain in
question
￿ . However, the perturbation
￿
may affect other chains as well, which in turn may affect
￿ . To simplify
matters we do not discuss this effect, which will be negligible when we work with a large number of agents
! ,
and when we are sufﬁciently “close” to a steady state.Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 9














￿ (see Fig. 2b). By a





￿ there is a ﬁnite
probability that D-agent
N becomes a passive local maximum in a number of steps, so we will












N , then with
probability one the perturbation
N becomes a passive local maximum to
N . This is a primary
mechanism where D-agents may survive, with a continual explotation to C-agents.













￿ (see Fig. 2c). This
corresponds to a destructive perturbations for D-strategy is replicated “downhill” (in payoff)























D . By this mechanism one expects an increase
in the defectors population.
We have established that:




￿ ), a perturbationat time
# of a D-agent
N to a C-agent


































D containing at least 2 cooperators, can generate


















































￿ there is a ﬁnite probability that in the
subsequent time steps the chain of cooperators enlarges by incorporating


















































￿ there is a ﬁnite probability that
in the subsequent time steps D-agent
N becomes a passive local maximum to














































￿ then with probability one































￿ at time step






































￿ , and must be considered a new perturbation to agent
￿ . From

































￿ , a constructive, neutral






part of the ’downhill’ destructive perturbations may be recovered into C-agents from
￿
￿ . If a neutral
perturbation results, then agent
￿ becomes a passive local maximum, and the original chain
￿ ends
at the new local minimum at agent
￿ . Finally if agent




￿ , then this would have accomplished the interesting feature that destructive perturbations may
also travel “uphill” in payoff function. The above dynamical process is illustrated in Fig. 3, where
a schematic simulation is shown (together with the downhill replication process) and a sequence of
uphill perturbations reach the local maximum and completely destroy the original chain of cooper-
ators. Below we study conditions under which these perturbations may occur, and are found to be
very important in the development of cooperative steady states.
3.3 Leaders evolution
The network adaptation shapes the steady state network in a very heterogenous manner. We deﬁne a
C- or D-leader, as the agent which has the maximum payoff among their respective subpopulation.
Out of all the cooperators, the chains local maxima are candidates to be the C-leader. Likewise for
D-agents, among all the passive local maxima, there will be one with the maximum payoff and will




￿ ] the C [D] agent with the maximum payoff in the whole system. Due to











￿ , then any link received by leader

















































































selects a C-agent as a new neighbor. The subsequent time steps show how the replication of D-strategy not only
goes downhill in payoff function, but also uphill. The latter perturbations are allowed if the payoff gap between
neighbor C-agents have are below a speciﬁc bound (see Eq. (12)).
type, following Proposition 2a. Then, for each perturbationreceived by the leader on time step
# , the









































￿ .We will referto this subset
of C-agents as “wealthyagents”, and providedthe conditionis satisﬁed, its payoff(andconnectivity)
is always non-decreasing in time.
However, an unstable situation occurs whenever the C-leader does not have the largest payoff in
the whole network. In this case the leader
￿ has a ﬁnite probability of receiving a D-neighbor with a
larger payoff, which will produce a drastic event in the subsequent time steps:
￿ and its associated
chains will replicate the D-strategy. As an extreme situation consider C-leader
￿ leading a number
of chains of cooperators, and the rest of the population consists of D-agents. We can easily ﬁnd a
lower bound on
$











￿ is the D-agent with minimum payoff among defectors. Otherwise all perturbation the C-
agents receive from the D-agents will be destructive. In this case, dependingon the actual conﬁgura-
tion of the chain and the perturbations received, the evolution of the network has a large probability
of reaching the all-D network.
The above discussion establishes two bounds on the payoff of C-leaders for their development
and survival,
Proposition 3 Let’s consider
￿ [
￿ ] as the C- [D-] agent with the maximum payoff among their
respective subpopulations and























￿ , each perturbation received by
￿ at time step
# will be of constructive type





















. The same result holds for all C-agents

























￿ , perturbationsreceivedby all C-agentsat time
# will be destructive, anddrives
the system towards the absorbing all-D network.
One important consequence of Proposition 3-a is that it provides conditions such that coopera-
tive leaders emerge in the dynamical evolution of the proposed game. In other words the payoff of
wealthyagentsdoes notfollowa randomstochastic process;on thecontrary,theyhavea nondecreas-
ing payoff in time providedthe condition on leaders payoff is satisﬁed. Another consequence of this
result is that the wealthy agents are constantly absorbing perturbations of unsatisﬁed D-agents, thus
helps the network approach a steady state.
3.4 Example: Full capacity cooperators chain.
In the previous section we studied the dynamics of leaders; we now turn to a tractable example for





























D (where for simplicity we have








































. Lets assume that
all chain members (except the absolute maximum
@ ) have exactly
￿ passive local maxima D-agents







￿ the number of C-neighbors the C-agent
￿ has. We can now
study in some detail how after a destructive perturbation acts on agent
￿ , a new constructive, passive

















































































































￿ as a function of







region in between the parallel lines corresponds to where Eq. (10) is satisﬁed, and therefore the
perturbation generates a new passive local maximum (P in Fig. 4). Below this region, we have
constructive perturbations (denoted by C), where after Proposition 2-a agent
￿ becomes again a
C-agent after some ﬁnite steps. Above the region P, we have destructive perturbations (D in Fig. 4),
where the D-agent





, thus becomes a perturbation satisfying











￿ , and so on
until the chain is completely destroyed.
Another alternative scenario occurs if the original perturbation on




new chain is not in a steady state. The “search” done by
￿ and its
￿ D-neighbors, will gradually
improve the payoff of





Anotherway to illustrate how vulnerableare full capacity chains is to ﬁx
￿ and
￿ , and study from
Eq. (10) the possible
￿
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Y in terms of incentive to defect
￿ .








































































1.55 4 7 11 17 26
1.55 5 9 13 21 32
1.55 6 10 16 24 38
1.75 5 10 17 29 51
1.95 5 11 20 40 77














￿ is increased, and shows how vulnerable to de-
structive perturbations “full capacity” chains are.
3.5 Payoff gaps and protection to leaders.
The previous example shows that chains with a small payoff difference between consecutive agents







￿ ), are easily wiped out by uphill perturbations.In order for steady states to










￿ . More precisely, consider a perturbation reaches agent
￿ and in order for an uphill perturbation






















before receiving the perturbation. For the purpose of illustration we show in Table 1 examples of
‘minimal’chainswhichsatisfy Eq.12anduphillperturbationsare inhibited,wherewe haveassumed










, and different values of































  is thelargestintegergreaterthan
! ). Clearly these minimal chains which do not allow uphill perturbations have payoff gaps which
increase for larger
￿ . Thus an important conclusion is that in a dynamic evolution one expects uphill
perturbations to occur more frequently for larger
￿ .
Theabovecharacterizationisimportantbecausewemaynowdistinguishthose’dangerouschains’
such that their payoff gaps do not inhibit uphill cascades and reach the local maximum or C-leader.
A C-leader is ’protected’ when all its associated chains are not dangerous. Notice that whenever the
C-leader replicates the D-strategy, a large multiplicative effect occurs, for all the chains connectedEvolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 13
to the C-leader will replicate by downhill perturbations the D-strategy. It is clear that this will give
origin to a large cascade affecting large portions of the whole network (see Section 4.5).
A closer analysis of the network dynamics reveals a mechanism which reduces the number of
dangerous chains and provides protection to the C-leader (and possibly C-local maxima). Given the
payoffof the D-leader












































Consider only perturbations which arise from unsatisﬁed D-agents which do not belong to the C-
cluster, i.e. these perturbations which do not arise from an uphill process. It is straightforward to
















































be nondecreasing in time, for this payoff level of
￿ . Note that the payoff of
￿ ﬂuctuates in time, thus
this effect will increase payoff gaps of different pairs of agents. The precise condition for a chain to






On the other hand, if the chain is not protected and an uphill cascade develops, then on the next
time step there is a ﬁnite probability that a new uphill perturbation occurs. In particular agent
￿
￿
becomes the new D-leader and a new
￿
￿
￿ agent must be selected on each chain of cooperators. In the
numerical examples in Section 4.5 we will show this process in action. We summarize these results
in:
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a C-local maximum
￿ with a cluster of agents forming chains








￿ , then for each chain in the

















































￿ satisﬁes (12). Under this conditions the mechanism effectively reduces the number of
dangerous chains in the cluster by one.
The application of the above result to each dangerous chains connected to the C-leader, may
effectively protect the C-leader from uphill perturbations. A consequence of this result is that only
when all C-local maxima in the network are protected the network will reach surely a cooperative









absorbecontinuouslyconstructiveperturbationsand drainthe total numberof perturbations.Clearly,
the above statement provides sufﬁcient conditions such that a steady state may be reached; in com-
puter simulations a steady state may still have dangerous chains which have not been exploited by
uphill perturbations.
4 Numerical simulations
We will now address by the use of computer simulations how the dynamic model evolves in time,
and the central question of how cooperation performs in such an adaptive environment. Our results







￿ and all networks
studied. Also, surprisingly, the average payoff of defectors is larger than that of cooperators. This
points to the existence of leaders, which have a very important role in determining the asymptotic
evolution in time of the system. The main parameters in this investigation will be the incentive to
defect
￿ , the network adaptation rate
￿ , and the connectivity of the network
￿ .
The statistical measures we studied have been



















































￿ (14)14 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz











C-agents randomly distributed in the network
￿ . Any initial fraction of C-agents above this value
was observed not to inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome. Of course if too few initial cooperators are present
in the network, the C-leader may not be wealthy enough to promote cooperation, and the ﬁnal state




steps without network adaptation (nor indicator measurements), to allow for a transient behavior







distributed randomly among the
￿ agents in the network.















































Fig. 5 (a) Time series of fraction of cooperative agents
￿
￿
￿ . (b) Corresponding time series of the different












￿ ) having a link.






















4.1 Temporal evolution and steady states characteristics
A typical time series evolution of cooperation fraction
￿
￿ is displayed in Fig. 5a. First notice that the
cooperative fraction increases on average steadily, until most of the network agents are cooperative.
Computation of the density of all the possible links among agents, reveal that the number of links
















￿ ) and the chains of cooperators satisfy (7), as Propo-
sition 1-a shows. On the other hand the number of links between C- and D- agents is low (most of
the time below 20 %). Therefore the structure of the steady state network is composed by chains of
cooperators together with exploiting D-agents.
A closer look at the distributions of links corresponding to the steady state is shown in Fig. 5c,
which reveal differences in how C- and D-agents connect. In general one obtains an exponentialEvolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 15






















Fig. 6 Time series of fraction of cooperative agents
￿
￿
￿ . (Bottom) Corresponding time series of the different
































decrease in the number of links between C-agents with C-agents (C-C links), while D-agents exploit
a narrow distribution of C-agents. Notice also that the maximum number of links C-C links may
become several times the average connectivity
￿ , and there is approximately 10% of solitary D-
agents without links at all.








￿ the evolution is characterized by a roughly steady increase in
￿







￿ decreases on average monotonously






￿ some runs displayglobal oscillationsin












￿ are coupled together, and follow always
the trend displayed in Fig. 6. The ﬁgure shows a typical time evolution where several large global
cascades developed, before settling into a cooperative steady state. The number of large cascades
may vary signiﬁcantly from run to run. The ﬁnal outcome of the above temporal evolution may
either be a cooperative steady state, or the all-D network. The origin of these large cascades and
the asymptotic outcome relies on a strong interaction between C- and D-leaders, and a detailed
discussion is delayed up to section 4.5.
4.2 Cooperation enhancement
We now characterize with numerical experiments how cooperation performs asymptotically in time
for various values of incentives to defect
￿ , networks adaptations
￿ and connectivity
￿ .
Figure 7 displays the results of the fraction of C-agent
￿
￿
￿ as a function of the incentive to defect
￿ . The experiment was runned for
￿
￿














chosen, the total time of integration
was sufﬁcient in orderfor the system to reach either a steady state, or the all-D network. As before,a












￿ , we did not include in the statistical average of Fig. 7




￿ absorbing state is present in the whole range of
￿ , and our results show that depending on the initial condition, the system may reach either of them.
Numerical simulations with different network connectivities



























￿ . We also tested regular lattices as initial networks, as
those studiedin Nowakand May (1992).The resultingﬁnal networkwas random,andno trace of the
initial regular lattice was observed: e.g. comparison of the average asymptotic value of
￿
￿ starting
with a regular ﬁrst neighbors lattice was statistically insigniﬁcant to that of starting from a random16 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz














Fig. 7 Fraction of cooperation
￿






















￿ . The ﬁlled symbols indicate










￿ (dashed line) seldomly
reached a steady state, and the average was performed on all ﬁnal conditions, including all-D networks. The






￿ time steps and 50 random realizations for every point.
￿
￿




















On the other hand, for smaller values of
￿ , the network adaptability occurs less frequently, and a












￿ as a function of
￿ , shows a continuous crossover from the high cooperation level found in cooperative steady states










￿ ) is also included in Fig. 7.
Our results are in agreeement with those obtained by other authors9: the fraction of cooperation
decreases as
￿ increases, up to a critical
￿
￿ where defection always dominates. As long as there is
























This marks a strong contrast between adaptive and non-adaptive networks. In the latter case
partial cooperation is found up to a critical
￿
￿ , after which cooperation disappears. The former
case displays an enhanced cooperation throughout the whole range of
￿ , which coexists with the
absorbing all-D network. In the case of non-adaptive network D-agents can get a larger proﬁt only
at the boundaries where they meet C-agents to exploit (Nowak and May 1992). By enumerating the
ﬁnite neighborhoodconﬁgurations possible at the boundaryof C- and D-agents in regular networks,
one may ﬁnd a lower bound on
￿ such that D-strategy is replicated by the boundary C-agents (thus
the D-agents advances and invades a cluster of C-agents). With the adaptive network considered
here, clusters of D-agents tend to dissapear and only D-agents exploitinga large number of C-agents
is able to replicate D-strategies.
9 (Nowak and May 1992), (Szab´ o and T¨ oke 1998) used regular lattices but not a strict Prisoners Dilemma
game because they considered the PD parameter
￿
[
￿ . In this case the one-shot game does not have a unique
Nash equilibrium. Despite this, the fraction of cooperators is analogous to the results obtained in Fig. 7.Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 17


























Fig. 8 Distribution of individual payoff for each subpopulation (C and D-agents) in a ﬁnal equilibrium steady





















































Althoughcooperationin steady states is highly enhancedthroughoutthe network,we ﬁnd an uneven
wealth distribution among agents. The surprising result is that the average payoff of D-agents in a
steady state is found to be larger than C-agents, and increases with larger
￿ .
A comparison is illustrated in Fig. 8, where the wealth distribution for a low and a large value
of
￿ is shown. This is a speciﬁc consequence of the selective adaptability of the network, and does
not occur with ﬁxed and regular neighborhoodsas those studied in previous works (Nowak and May
1992, Lindgren 1991). The network adaptation favors D-agents to search for C-agents to exploit,
until they become satisﬁed (or become C-agents). Once in steady states, D-agents are passive local
maxima, and have reached the maximum payoff allowed by its neighborhood.C-agents, do not have
such mechanism andonly those agents with sufﬁciently large payoffmay also increase its payoff(by
Proposition 3). The overall effect is that in general we observe that D-agents are wealthier than C-
agents.In otherwords, ournumericalﬁndingspoints that with networkadaptabilityboth populations18 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz
of agents may be better off in a steady state: C-agents may become more numerous, but on average
poorer than defectors.
More detailed numerical simulations show that the unevenness in wealth distribution occurs
in particular in the region of incentive to defect
￿ where Nowak and May obtained only partial
cooperation. As a measure of uneven wealth distribution, consider the computation of the average






￿ , respectively.Figure 9 shows how the







￿ behaves as a function of
￿ . In general we ﬁnd that on






















fast convergence to a steady state) the result holds for most of the range of
￿ . There seems to be a
relation between the speed a steady state is reached and the possibility of D-agents to improve on
average their payoff past their C-agents rivals.
4.4 Leaders and topology of cooperators clusters
The uneven wealth distribution found in the previous section, features a novel result for standard
evolutionary game theory. A priori one would end in a contradiction in our model, if one would
applythe commonassumptionthatstrategieswith averagehighestpayofftendto dominatethewhole
population. On the contrary, we ﬁnd that the sustainability of our networks depends crucially on the
payoff relation of a minor number of agents, and these are precisely those agents with maximal
payoff on each subpopulation. In this section we present more detailed numerical results, which
reveal some other leaders properties.
An illustration of the maximum payoff cooperators and defectors may reach in a steady state is
shown in Fig. 10. We have performed a numerical study varying the incentive










￿ , averaging over
￿
￿ runs. We ﬁnd a steady growth with
￿ for the maximum payoff of both
C- and D-leaders. Also, due to the imposed conservation of the total number of links in our model,
the maximum payoff acquired by C-leaders depends on the average connectivity
￿ of the network:
for large values of
￿ , C-leaders may acquire larger payoffs.





























￿ , averaged over 30 runs).
Thestructureof the networkchangesas a functionof
￿ at steady states. On the onehand,we have
computed the number of C-local maxima which are all candidates of being C-leaders. Figure 11aEvolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 19
shows the results. For low
￿ there is a large fraction of competing local maxima in the steady state,
while for large incentive










of the whole network. On the other hand, we have measured the relative size of the
cluster of the agents connected to the C-leader as a function of
￿ . Figure 11b, shows that for high
￿ approximately half of the population is associated with that of the leaders cluster. These results
indicates that for larger
￿ , the structure of the network depends very strongly on the robustness of
only a few local maxima with a very large payoff, and the C-leader dominates at least half of the
C-population.
A typical network structure may be obtained by displaying only the links corresponding to the
neighbors of C-agents from which they imitate. Figure 12 offers such view. The local maxima are
observed to lead large clusters of C-agents. It is clear that an exogenous perturbation ﬂipping the
strategy of any of the local maxima will result in a large dropout of cooperation in very few time
steps. This will affect of course other chains due to the links not shown in Fig. 12. Thus the vulner-
ability of the network to stochastic perturbations is dramatically increased for large
￿ .
Finally, in the discussion on chains robustness (Section 3.5), we argued that in order for uphill
perturbations not to occur, the “payoff gaps” between neighboring agents had to be sufﬁciently big
(see table 1). A closer look at the resulting chains on any particular steady states reveal that in
general “gaps” are very frequent and large. In Table 2 we reproduce the payoffs for several chains
on a particular steady state. The results show that indeed at steady states gaps for agents with high
payoff develop. In the next section we will relate this result with the occurrence of avalanches and
large cascades.



































































￿ . (a) Distribution of number of maximum local
maxima at steady state. (b) Fraction of agents which belong to the C-leader cluster (
￿
[
￿ , averaged over 30
runs).
4.5 Leaders and global cascades
We now turnto a detailed discussionof the role of leaders in the global cascades describedabove.As
before, we denote the C-agent with maximal payoff by
￿ , while the D-agent with maximum payoff
by
￿ .20 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz


































































































1.55 7 12 15 21 37
1.55 5 13 16 24 38
1.55 5 13 21 26 38
1.55 9 14 17 32 38
Proposition 3-a showed how the payoff of a C-leader is a nondecreasing function of time, as
long as it is larger than the payoff of
￿ . Figure 13 illustrates a numerical simulation where the
(rescaled) payoff of the C- and D-leaders are shown along with
￿
￿
￿ as a function of time, where























￿ , the maximum [minimum] of
￿
￿ is approximately reached if
$
￿Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Networks 21






￿ , and may evenaffect






, where a drop of
$
￿ is observed. It remains to
be explained what is the mechanism by which a D-leader may increase its payoff past a C-leader?



















Fig. 13 Time series of
￿


















To answer this question we performed a close inspection to the evolution of a D-leader. Our
results show that it is the occurrence of uphill perturbations on a chain of cooperators connected
to the C-leader, which allows in very few time steps for a D-leader to increase its payoff past the
C-leader. As discussed in Section 3.5, uphill perturbations are inhibited if the payoff “gap” between
C-agents in a chain is sufﬁciently large (see eqn. (12)).This boundarywhere uphill perturbationsare
inhibited increases linearly with
￿ , thus for large
￿ these perturbations will appear more frequently.

















global cascades could easily be observed, and it became easier for larger
￿ .
Consider a chain of cooperators whose local maximum is the C-leader and the whole chain
allows the development of uphill perturbations. Alternatively the discussion is also valid for a chain
associated to a local maximum with large payoff. As a D-agent perturbs this chain at one point,
uphill perturbations will create a “wave” of new D-agents moving along the chain with larger and
larger payoff (see for a schematic simulation Fig. 3). At some point, the payoff of these newly
created D-agents will become so large that they will effectively become an uphill “wave” of new






￿ the slope of the
D-leader’s payoff changes abruptly. Also note that the maximum payoff attained by a D-leader at




￿ , which occurs when the C-leader
￿ is perturbed by an uphill
perturbation becoming a D-leader. Whenever a C-leader is perturbed, then a new C-leader with less






￿ in Fig. 13.
Once uphill perturbation affect a C-leader (or a local maximum with a similar payoff), downhill
perturbations will start. This will generate a large global cascade replicating D-strategy on all the
remainingchainsassociatedto this localmaximum.Unlikethe uphillperturbationswhichoccursat a
rateproportionaltothe networkadaptation
￿ ,this processoccursdeterministicallyoneverytimestep
until the whole cluster of C-agents disappears. Also, the evolution of the D-leader follows closely
the rapid decrease of the fraction of cooperation. On each time step of the downhill replication of













￿ . This occurs because at time
# , the previous D-leader replicated its strategy to



















￿ until a new D-leader from another chain is selected.
The subsequent time steps after the leaders cluster replicates D-strategy depends on the network
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then cooperation may be recovered and the time series of
￿
￿ shows a minimum. Otherwise, the
C-leader may be affected by more destructive perturbations driving it towards the payoff lower
boundary (Proposition 3-b) where C-chains may survive. This may drive the whole C-population
to extinction, reaching the full defective state.
If the fraction of cooperation reaches a minimum, cooperation may build up again. However we
ﬁnd that the number of oscillations is ﬁnite, and the system either reaches a steady state of the all-D
network.We have alreadydescribed two mechanismsby which global cascades will be hinderedand
a steady state may be reached:











￿ , will absorbe a number of constructive perturbations, which
effectively decrease the number of links between unsatisﬁed D-agents.
(b) by Proposition 4 the payoff gaps for all wealthy agents is nondecreasing, making it possible to
‘protect’ the C-leader from uphill perturbations. Therefore the number of “dangerous” chains
which favour uphill perturbations right up to the C-leader decreases.





￿ , and the “pro-
tection mechanism” to C-leaders from uphill perturbations ceases. If a dangerous chain is perturbed
then large globalcascade is ignited,which in veryfew time steps affects a largefractionof the whole
network. On the other hand, if “protection” of the C-leader was guaranteed, then there would be no
dangerous chains to perturb. In this case, the maximum attainable payoff the uphill perturbations












, where the perturbation did not affect the C-leader at all, and the size of the cascade
was small. By mechanism (a) above, the network reached a steady state by a steady reduction on the
available unsatisﬁed D-agents links.
We have performed several other computer simulations to visualize different dynamic evolution
of the network for various values of
￿ and
￿ . For small values of the adaptability parameter
￿ , as
shown in panel (a), the typical time for the network to reach a steady state is very large, and the
leader
￿ increase its payoff very slowly. The fraction of cooperators increases on average as the
leader increases its number of links, and only small cascades are shown. In this case, the network
has many local maxima, and the cascades do not affect a large portion of the network.
For a higher value of
￿ , the structure of the network has fewer local maxima, and large cascades
are possible. Panel (b) shows that the fraction of cooperation grows steadily, and suddenly when an
uphill perturbation wipes off the cluster, most of the network is affected. This particular run also
illustrates how even after having a large
$
￿ the asymptotic solution is the all-D network. The key
factor to sustain cooperation is to have several “independent” local maxima, with large payoff.





￿ , where the network is composed
of mostly unsatisﬁed D-agents together with a very wealthy leader
￿ (which at least has sufﬁcient
neighbors to keep up its payoff). Note how the leader is able to increases its number of links by the







￿ the fraction of cooperators
also increases. This recoveryis a clear exampleof the importanceof a wealthy leader, which enables






￿ did not reach
the C-leader and wealthy agents just absorbed all the unsatisﬁed D-agent links.
4.6 Noise and errors
In typical evolutionary game theory studies, one is interested to contrast the main results of the
original game to those from another perturbed game, which takes into account random variations of
the assumed rationality, i.e. errors are possible.
To this end we have modiﬁedour modelto accountfor two differenttypes of noise. The ﬁrst type
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Fig. 14 Time series of
￿
￿ and the rescaled payoff of the cooperator leader (
￿
￿






























































￿ that the agent switches
spontaneously its strategy.










￿ there is a region of the incentive to defect
￿ where cooperation is sustained, but now there is a critical value
￿
￿ where defection sets in. The
nature of the transition is that these perturbations affect those agents with highest payoff, which are
knownto sustain cooperation.Also we haveseen that after a largecascade,the cooperativestate may
be recovered if there is a C-leader with sufﬁciently large payoff. The speed at which the cooperative
state formsdependsonthenetworkadaptationrate
￿ andthenoiseintensity,whichintroducesfurther
randomness. Therefore, there is always a sufﬁciently strong noise intensity which perturb most C-
local maxima before they ever regenerate, driving the system to the all-D network.
We display in Fig. 15 two time series of
￿
￿ and the payoff of the maximal C- and D-agents,
showing the two possible asymptotic states. Both panels show how the C-leader is affected by the
noise perturbations,andnew C-local maximatake its place.In Fig. 16 we display how the fractionof
cooperation changes as










￿ . The value of the sharp
transition depends on that of the chosen noise intensities.24 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz



































Fig. 15 Time series of
￿


























































Fig. 16 Fraction of cooperation vs.





￿ corresponds to the probability that








￿ is the probability that an agent is selected and its strategy
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5 Discussion
Social and economical interactions are frequently based on the ability of the agents to choose and
refuse partners depending on their own interests. In this paper we have proposed, assuming the
bounded rationality of agents, a framework that naturally incorporates such possibility. We have
presented numerical and theoretical results of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game played in an adaptive
network, where the agents have the possibility to change their local neighborhood depending on
their level of satisfaction and
In other recent studies of network evolution the adaptation does not depend on the outcome of
a game, but instead links are created or destroyed according to a balance between beneﬁt and cost
these represent (Watts 1999, Jackson and Watts 1999, Goyal and Joshi 1999, Bala and Goyal 1999).
The paper of Goyal and Joshi (1999) studies network formation where the costs incurred to form a
new link is taken only by one of the agents. The agent receiving a link does not incur in a cost and
just shares the beneﬁt. If the link beneﬁts both agents, then it is established, otherwise it is discarded.
In our case, we have followed a different approach. Our agents cannot assess a priori if the receiving
link will be entirely beneﬁcial or not, but as it is costless, it is willing to accept it. Also as only
D-agents are responsable for the initiative of neighborhoodadaptation, they are mostly interested in
ﬁnding a C-agent to exploit. Thus in order to avoid a generation of (costless) links, we speciﬁcally
study an evolution where the number of links is conserved.
Another related work to ours is that of Ashlock, Smucker, Stanley, and Tesfatsion (1995), where
the network is not assumed a priori, but is determined endogenously from expected payoffs agents
have across them. If this payoffexceeds a giventhreshold,then the agent makes an offer to play with
that neighbor; next, it revises all offers it receives and refuses those which are below his threshold.
Therefore the game is carried out on a network which is formed in a pre-play stage, depending on
the outcome of the previous game. Their main result also includes that cooperation is highly en-
hanced, although a steady state is never reached for exploiter D-agents migrate continuously among
C-agents. Our approach assumes agents computation capabilities to be much more restrictive, and
C-agents cannot explicitly refuse to play with D-agents. In our model steady states display D-agents
exploiting C-agents. This results from two assumptions: (i) satisﬁed D-agents do not review their
neighbors, and (ii) the desire a C-agent has to dismiss an interaction with a D-neighbor exactly
balances the effort of the D-neighbor to maintain the interaction.
Ourapproachfocusesin a speciﬁc couplingbetweenthe networkadaptationmechanismwith the
agents strategy. C-agents play a conservative role, while unsatisﬁed D-agents “search” for new C-
agents in orderto improvetheir payoff.The searchingstops wheneverall D-agents becomesatisﬁed,
reaching a steady state conﬁguration. In some sense, the network adaptability is analogous to a
mutation process (as in the traditional evolutionary game theory) to the network, which succeeds in
ﬁnding an ‘optimal’ compromise to the roles assigned to each agents subpopulation. This solution
makes (i) D-agents in steady state become satisﬁed, with a higher average payoff (with respect to
C-agents),and (ii) C-agents are in generalunsatisﬁed (butconformists),with a lower averagepayoff.
In a more detailed description, the searching capabilities of defectors has an interesting effect
towards the evolution of network “leaders”. The C-leader is selected among those C-local maxima
with largest payoff. These special agents are responsible of sustaining cooperation, for whenever
their payoff is larger than the D-leader, its payoff increases by accomodating new C-neighbors.




them, specially under some destructive endogenous perturbations produced by searching D-agents.
Thesespecialperturbationsmayoccurforgivennetworkconﬁgurations,through’dangerouschains’,
and may affect a C-leader. When this happens, global cooperation is temporally abandoned and
a large cascade of D-strategy replication is started. However, the payoff of D-agents soon drops
until once again cooperation slowly recovers when the C-leader is the wealthiest agent in the whole26 M. G. Zimmermann and V. M. Egu´ ıluz
network. If the latter does not happen, then by more destructive perturbations there is probability
that the system reaches the all-D network. We also remarked that there exists a mechanism by which
the ‘dangerous’ chains in the network decrease in number, providing the possibility that the leader
may be well protected and inhibiting large cascades.
Our main conclusion shows that cooperation among a set of selﬁsh agents may display coopera-
tionbasedonevolvinglocalneighborhoods.Noticethatthisis trueevenwhenthenetworkadaptation
is very small, changing only the time scale when a cooperative steady state is reached. Also very re-
markably, if one considers the average payoff of agents, the social dilemma holds, for on average
defectors are wealthier than cooperators.
Finally we mention the work of Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod (1999) which show the relevance of
context-preservation, i.e. dynamics where the neighborhood remained unaltered get better average
payoff than those dynamics that do not preserve the neighborhoods. The framework we have pre-
sented in this paper, allows us to study a different dynamics with variable adaptation. Our results
show that cooperation can be sustained even in situations where the neighborhoods are not fully
preserved, with the fraction of cooperation being similar to the preserved one. However, our model
differs from the situations studied by Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod (1999) in which the adaptation of
the network is independent of the process of decision making, i.e. there is no feedback from the
payoff to the network evolution. In our framework, the feedback between payoff and network adap-
tation is clear: the adaptation of the network only takes place locally for the unsatisﬁed agents. This
difference is fundamental to explain the results we have obtained.
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